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Abstract
ASEAN-5’s continued economic growth with high oil and trade intensities means
it is a fast growing region with a significant presence in the global energy market.
This paper identifies three main drivers of oil price shocks - oil-supply, global-
activity and oil-specific demand shocks for the period 2000-2013. Subsequently,
it assesses the effects of the identified oil shocks on the ASEAN-5’s macroeco-
nomic variables and examines the responses of monetary policy. Since the recent
shocks are largely demand driven, the impulse responses and historical decom-
position for the ASEAN-5 highlight that the effects on inflation are accentuated
while the effects on economic growth are less disruptive. The exchange rate re-
sponses are mostly positive while the effects on trade are positive for Malaysia, a
net oil exporter and are moderately negative for the oil importers. Consequently
the ASEAN-5’s central banks could tighten their monetary policy in response
to higher inflation without fear of weakening their economies. The empirical
results highlight that for monetary policy responses to be more supportive of
growth, policy makers in these economies should examine the underlying causes
of the future oil shocks.
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1. Introduction
Economist generally concur that oil price shocks can push the cost of pro-
duction up, leading to higher inflation and causing contractionary effects on
economic growth and trade balances. Though the oil shocks that occurred be-
tween 2003 to 2008 appear to have inflationary effects on the ASEAN-5, namely
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, but they only
caused modest disruptive effects on economic growth. These minimal impacts
occurred despite these economies being more trade and oil intensive in their
production compared to other countries in the region. The focus of this paper
is therefore to examine empirically the effects of oil price shock on ASEAN-5
and to asses why this time it only had minimal effects on these economies.
Hamilton (2013) and Kilian & Hicks (2013) note that oil demand from emerg-
ing Asia is an important factor influencing the recent global oil price shocks.
Since 2000, the ASEAN-5 oil demand has increased by 45.2 % while in 2012,
East Asian account for about 30% of the global energy demand.2 The oil usage
as a proportion of GDP in the ASEAN-5 is about two to three times that of
typical OECD countries, theoretically, making these economies more vulnerable
to oil shocks (Downes, 2007). Additionally, oil consumption continues to grow
while oil production slows making this region one of the largest net importers
of oil.
Despite ASEAN-5’s increasing importance in the global oil market, the num-
ber of empirical studies focussing on the effects of oil price shocks on macroe-
conomic variables and their relative importance to policy makers in this region
are however limited. Some existing studies on the Asian economies such as
Abeysinghe (2001), Cunado & Perez de Gracia (2005), Ran & Voon (2012),
Cunado et al. (2015) focus on the effects of oil shocks on output and price levels
while Le & Chang (2013) assesses the effects on trade balances. To our knowl-
2Source: US Energy Information Administration respectively. The ASEAN-5 is part of the
East Asian region.
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edge no studies in Asia focussed on the effects of oil shocks on monetary policy
and exchange rates, two important variables for small open economies. This
paper differs from the existing studies in the following ways. First, drawing
on insights from Kilian & Murphy (2014), Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009),
this paper identifies three main drivers of oil price shocks - an oil-supply dis-
ruption shock, a global-activity shock and an oil-specific demand shock for the
period between 2000 to 2013. Subsequently, it assesses the effects of each of
these oil shocks on the ASEAN-5’s macroeconomic variables and examines the
corresponding responses of monetary policy.
This paper contributes to and extends the existing literature as follows: (i)
it builds a small open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) frame-
work that uses macroeconomic theory and stylized facts to impose appropri-
ate identifying restrictions on the contemporaneous and dynamic relationships
among the domestic macroeconomic variables and the oil market variables; (ii)
it conducta a country-by-country analysis and examines the differential effects
of demand versus supply driven oil shocks on trade, output, inflation, interest
rate and exchange rate; and (iii) it uses historical decomposition and variance
decomposition techniques, to assess the impact of the recent oil price shocks on
these five economies with respect to their level of trade intensity, oil dependency
and oil usage. In doing so, it helps us to analyse why the effects of the 2004 and
2006 oil price shocks were relatively modest on trade and economic activities.
Due to its trade intensity and high integration with the global production
chain, the ASEAN-5 experience different level of vulnerabilities to various oil
price shocks. An oil shock driven by a supply disruption causes a transitory
stagflationary pressure for about a year where output in these economies de-
clines while inflation increases irrespective of their level of oil dependency and
oil intensity to production. Monetary policy tend to be more accommodative,
which helps the ASEAN-5 to recover within a year following an oil-supply dis-
ruption shock. The recent oil price shocks however are largely demand driven,
either caused by the rise in global activity or due to the rise in oil-specific demand
shock driven by expectations about future changes in oil or financial conditions.
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The impulse responses and historical decomposition highlight that the effects
on inflation accentuates while the effects on economic growth is positive in the
case of the former and negative in the case of the latter. Further, the effects
on exchange rates are largely positive, driven by rising domestic price levels,
making these economies less competitive in the global market. The effects on
trade appear to be positive for Malaysia, the only net oil exporter in the group.
For the rest of the economies, who are net oil importers, the effect on trade
is moderately negative or insignificant. Consequently, the ASEAN-5’s central
banks could tightened their monetary policy in response to higher inflation, es-
pecially in the high oil importing economies of the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand without fear of weakening these economies.
As small open economies there is little the ASEAN-5 can do to influence
future global oil price shocks. However, the monetary policy makers in these
economies can pursue more prudent measures when dealing with oil price shocks
by carefully considering the underlying causes of the shocks. This is crucial for
the operational conduct of monetary policy so that the policy responses are
more supportive of growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses the causes of recent oil
price shocks and empirical evidence assessing the impact of various oil price
shocks on macroeconomic variables. Section 3 reviews the oil price and the
ASEAN-5 economies. Section 4 describes the SVAR methodology and the iden-
tification issues concerning the modelling framework of small open economies.
Section 5, discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2. The Evolution of Global Oil Price and its Relationship to Macroe-
conomic Variables
The movement of global oil prices since 2000 could be attributed to the
interaction of various factors. Among them, the obvious two factors are global
oil production and global activity. Figure 1, highlights the relative importance
and timing of the fluctuations in these two variables and their different dynamic
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effects on the real price of oil.3
Figure 1: Oil Production, Global Activity and Oil Price
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
oil_ss glb_act oil_price
The most noticeable observation in Figure 1 is the rise in the real price of oil
since early 2002, which is almost synonymous to the surge in global economic
activity that started around 2001. Oil price increases are connected with strong
global economic growth until 2008 mostly driven by surge in the demand for oil
from emerging economies, particularly China and India (Hamilton, 2009; Kilian
& Hicks, 2013). It starts to decline in 2009 following the global financial crisis,
in line with the weakening global activity. During these periods, there is no clear
evidence to suggest that the increase in oil price was driven by any disruption in
oil supply. In fact between the periods 2002 to 2005, the global oil production
actually increased. The observation that the oil price movement is driven by
business cycle fluctuations, is consistent with that reported in Hamilton (2009),
Kilian (2009) and Kilian & Murphy (2014) .
From 2010 onwards, however, the oil price kept rising despite the weakening
of global economic activities and with no disruption in global oil production.
This raises the question of what is actually driving the oil price after 2010. Kilian
(2009) classifies any movements in oil price that are not accounted for by global
oil production and economic activity as precautionary demand for oil, driven by
3Source: US Energy Information Administration.
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fear of future oil supply shortfalls. Kilian & Murphy (2014) identifies a third
factor, speculative demand that could cause a hike in oil prices. This type of
demand is typically associated with inventory building with the expectation of
selling later at a profit. Ratti & Vespignani (2013) on the other hand highlights
that the rise in oil price between 2009-2010 was caused by global liquidity,
particulary due to the rise in China’s real M2. Hesary & Yoshino (2014) argues
that expansionary monetary policy stimulates oil demand through interest rate
channels and this combined with a rigid global oil production, creates a surge in
oil price. These highlight the distinctive need to decompose oil price into supply
disruption, demand driven and oil-specific demand shocks. In this instance, the
oil-specific demand can be broadly defined as any movement in the oil price
that are not accounted for by the oil supply and oil demand for global economic
activity.4
Since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983),the general consensus is that
oil price shocks can push cost of production up leading to higher inflation and
declining output level. Rising price levels in the economy can erode purchasing
power and depress demand, causing further contractionary impact on economic
growth, trade balances and real effective exchange rates.5 Some reason studies
however, find that the transmission of oil price shocks appear to be weaker and it
no longer affect the economies negatively. For example, Kilian (2007); Hamilton
(2009) and Blanchard & Gali (2010), find that after the 1980s, the oil price shock
only had a subdued effects on various US macroeconomic variables while Gomez-
Loscos et al. (2011, 2012) observe that oil price shocks progressively disappeared
since the 1970s in G-7 countries, only to reappear in 2000s especially on inflation.
4Oil-specific demand, therefore could include precautionary demand, speculative demand,
global liquidity and monetary policy effects through interest rate channels.
5See for example Lee et al. (1995); Hamilton (1996); Jimenez-Rodriguez & Sanchez (2004);
Gronwald (2008); Huang (2008) focusing on the recessionary effects of oil price shocks while
Bernanke et al. (1997); Barsky & Kilian (2004); Brown et al. (2004); Hamilton & Herrera
(2004); Oladosu (2009) focusing on the channels through which oil price shocks affects the
economy.
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The nature of the apparent changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil price
shocks, call into question the relevance of oil price changes as a significant source
of economic fluctuations.
Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, Kilian (2009), highlights
that the economic consequence of a demand driven oil shock is different from a
supply driven shock. He concludes that the effects of oil price surge on the US
output for the period between 2003 and 2008 is generally moderate due to the
key role played by the demand side factors as opposed to supply side factors.6 In
addition, Kilian (2009); Smith (2009) and Unalmis et al. (2009) find shocks from
oil demand to have pronounced effect on inflation but not on output. Cashin
et al. (2014) notices oil shocks driven by supply disruption typically cause a
fall in economic activity for oil importers while the impact is positive for oil
exporters that possess large amount of oil and gas reserves. Bernanke et al.
(1997); Leduc & Sill (2004); Blanchard & Gali (2010); Kormilitsina (2011) and
Hesary & Yoshino (2014) establish that the way monetary policy is conducted
may be responsible for the differential response of the economy to oil shocks.
The various sources of oil price shocks on small open economies such as the
ASEAN-5 are bound to affect the macroeconomic variables differently. The
transmission of the various oil shocks on macroeconomic variables can be illus-
trated as in Figure 2. If the oil price shock is caused by increased global demand,
the impact will be felt more directly on the ASEAN-5’s real and financial vari-
ables. If the shock is caused by supply side disruption, it is more likely to lead
to slower world growth and a disruption in the world financial markets. The
impact on the ASEAN-5 will be felt indirectly through the oil-specific demand
shock, driven by expectations about the future changes in oil and or financial
conditions. These assessments are important, particularly for monetary policy
makers to devise appropriate policy measures that can be supportive of growth.
6Hamilton (2009); Kilian & Hicks (2013) and Kilian & Murphy (2014) also support this
argument that the price surge between 2003 and 2008 is caused by strong global demand and
stagnating world oil production.
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Figure 2: ASEAN5 - Oil Shock Transmission Mechanism
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3. Oil Price Shocks and the ASEAN-5
Southeast Asia’s continued strong economic growth and high energy and
oil usage means it is a fast growing region with a significant presence in the
global energy market. Expanding economies coupled with demographic growth
are expected to increase energy demand in these region by about by 4.4% per
annum. Out of this, the industrial sector consumption is expected to grow at
an annual rate of 5.2%, rendering that a stable oil supply is crucial for economic
growth (ESSPA, 2011). Oil production in these region peaked in 2010 while
oil consumption continued to grow causing the difference between consumption
and production to rise from 31.5% in 2000 to about 59.8% in 2012, making this
region one of the largest net importer of oil.7.
How oil price shocks are transmitted into the individual ASEAN-5 economies
depends on the structure of these economies, particularly their level of trade in-
7Source: US Energy Information Administration respectively
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tensity, oil dependency and oil ussage in production. These features will also
have a large bearing on the way these economies respond to various oil price
shocks. As shown in Figure 3, the ASEAN-5 are trade intensive economies,
where the trade intensity is measured as sum of imports and exports as a per-
centage of GDP for each economy.8 Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand meet the
criterion for being super trading nations with trade shares over 100% of GDP.
This reflects the high integration of this region into global production chains
and it can be heavily influenced by developments in global activities (see, for
example, Abeysinghe, 2001; Le & Chang, 2013).
Figure 3: ASEAN-5 - Trade Intensity and Oil Self-sufficiency
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The right panel of Figure 3 shows the level of oil self-sufficiency, measured
as oil production less consumption over oil consumption.9 The ASEAN-5 differ
widely in terms of their oil dependency, from net oil exporter such as Malaysia,
to economies that are totally dependent on imports, such as Singapore and the
Philippines. Prior to 2004, Indonesia was a net oil exporter, after which it is a
net oil importer. This means that the impacts of higher oil prices on terms of
8Source: Trade variables are obtained from Datastream.
9A negative value, highlights the country is dependent on imported oil while a positive value
indicates it is a net exporter of oil. Data source: US Energy Information Administration.
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trade, output and exchange rate adjustments will be felt asymmetrically across
the region, thus requiring different monetary policy responses (see, for example,
Cunado & Perez de Gracia, 2005; Cashin et al., 2014; Cunado et al., 2015) .
As can be seen in Figure 4, oil consumption is rising in the ASEAN-5, high-
lighting the importance of oil in these economies.10 Oil intensity on the other
hand is marginally declining, due largely to a rapid rise in GDP compared to
the rise in oil consumption. As oil intensity declines, oil price shocks are ex-
pected to have a declining effects on these economies (Chang & Wong, 2003;
Blanchard & Gali, 2010). Generally, the ASEAN-5 are relatively more oil in-
tensive in their production compared to OECD economies, which means that
domestic consumer prices will be far more sensitive to changes in oil prices than
the OECD. The primary impacts on domestic prices, particularly for the oil de-
pendent economies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand will
be felt more deeply.
Figure 4: ASEAN-5 - Oil Consumption and Oil Intensity
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ASEAN-5 differs in terms of the regulation and taxation imposed on gasoline
and diesel prices. In the past, Malaysia and Indonesia regulated and subsidised
10Source: Oil consumption data is obtained from the US Energy Information Administration
while real GDP series is obtained from Datastream.
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retail prices for oil products. These two economies could afford to do so due to
their oil exporting status and the involvement of government in oil production.
The other three oil dependent economies allowed the market to determine the
price of oil. The existence of price regulation could affect the normal transmis-
sion of higher global oil prices to domestic economies due to their dependence
on political and administrative decisions (Downes, 2007). The above discussions
present some key indicators, particularly with respect to ASEAN-5’s exposure
to developments in world economic activity and with respect to its exposure to
the direct effects of oil price increases.
4. Modeling Framework
The interactions between oil and macroeconomic variables can be described
using an SVAR model
A0Xt = A1Xt−1 + A2Xt−2 + . . .+ ApXt−p + εt, (1)
where Xt is a (n× 1) vector of variables and Ai is a (n× n) coefficient matrix
for i = 0, 1, . . . p. εt is (n × 1) vector of serially uncorrelated structural shocks
with properties, E(εt) = 0 and E(εtε
′
t) = Σ, where Σ is a diagonal matrix
containing the variances of the structural disturbances. The SVAR in (1) can
be written as
A(L)Xt = εt, (2)
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator L and A(L) = A0 −A1L−
A2L
2 − . . .−ApLp. The reduced form VAR representation of (2) is
B(L)Xt = et, (3)
where B(L) = A−10 A(L) and the reduced form errors are related to the struc-
tural disturbances by et = A
−1
0 εt and (3) can now be represented as
B(L)Xt = A
−1
0 εt. (4)
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The impulse response functions of the SVAR model can be derived from the
Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation,
Xt = Φ(L)εt. (5)
where Φ(L) = (B(L))−1A−10 . Since the structural shocks εt are obtained by
imposing appropriate restrictions based on economic theory and stylized facts
on the contemporaneous matrix A0 and on the lag matrixes B(L), the effects
of these shocks on domestic variables can be captured more effectively through
the impulse response function given in (5).
4.1. Data and Time Series Properties
To construct SVAR models with small open economy properties, Xt for
each of the ASEAN-5 economies contains monthly observations of eight vari-
ables. These variables are grouped into two blocks, the oil block (X1,t) and the
domestic block (X2,t). In the oil block, there are three variables that broadly
captures conditions in the global oil market. These three variables are similar to
those identified by Kilian (2009), where changes in global crude oil production
(ost), obtained from the US Energy Information Administration, represents the
global oil supply. The global real activity (gat) is the dry cargo shipping rate in-
dex developed by Kilian (2009) to capture the fluctuations of the global demand
for industrial commodities.11 and the global real oil price (opt), is the crude
oil prices obtained from the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and deflated by
the US producer price index to proxy the real price of oil in the global market.
ASEAN-5 are small open economies, so X1,t = [ost, gat, opt] are exogenous to
these economies where fluctuations in the oil block will affect the ASEAN-5 but
not vice-versa.
To capture each of the ASEAN-5’s domestic economic conditions, the fol-
lowing five variables are included in the domestic block - trade balance (tbt) ,
11For a detailed explanation on the construction and the interpretation of this index, please
refer to Kilian (2009)
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output (yt), inflation (pit), interest rate (rt) and exchange rate (qt). ASEAN-5
are trade intensive and highly integrated into global production chains and any
changes in the oil block are expected to have large effects on the import and
export sectors of these economies. The real trade balance measured in US dol-
lar is included to capture the indirect effects of oil price shocks on the domestic
economic growth. The log of industrial production index is chosen as the output
variable to capture the economic activity while the log difference of consumer
price index is used to represent the inflation rate. Both output and inflation
also represent as the target variables of monetary policy while the short term
interbank rates are used as the interest rate variable to capture the movement
in the monetary policy instrument.12 The log of real effective exchange rate
is represented as the information market variable to capture the open nature
of the ASEAN-5 and the importance of international trade to these economies.
The output, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates are also the standard
set of variables used in the monetary literature to represent open economy mon-
etary business cycle models (see for example Sims, 1992). This second block of
variables X2,t = [tbt, yt, pit, rt, qt] are specific to each of the ASEAN-5.
The model is estimated using monthly data from January 2000 to December
2013. The period of study covers the post-1997 East Asian financial crisis, which
includes the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but excludes the 2014 oil crisis.
Detailed data descriptions and sources are provided in Table (3), in Appendix
A. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests indicate that each of the
trade balance, production index, interest rate and real exchange rate are I(1) se-
ries while domestic inflation show evidence of being stationary in all economies.
The three variables in the oil block by construction are stationary series. Trace
12Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Singapore’s monetary policy
is centred on the foreign exchange rate rather than the interest rate. Since the exchange
rate is found to be an ideal intermediate target with stable and predictable relationship with
price stability and economic conditions, it will be treated as a monetary policy instrument for
Singapore.
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tests and Maximum Eigenvalue test failed to clearly indicate whether cointe-
gration relationship exist amongst the I(1) variables. Since the objective of this
study is to assess the interrelationships among the variables and to correctly
identify the effects of various oil price shocks, the non-stationary variables are
all linearly de-trended instead of first differencing.13
4.2. Model Specification
To capture the oil block exogeneity phenomenon described in (4.1), Xt is
divided as follows:
Xt =
(
X1,t X2,t
)
.
where X1,t = [ost, gat, opt] and X2,t = [tbt, yt, pit, rt, qt] representing the oil and
domestic block respectively and equation (4) can now be represented as
 B11(L) 0
B21(L) B22(L)
 X1,t
X2,t
 =
 A(0)11 0
A
(0)
21 A
(0)
22
−1 ε1,t
ε2,t
 (6)
In line with the small open economy assumption, oil block exogeneity re-
strictions are imposed, by assuming that neither contemporaneous nor lagged
values of ASEAN-5 variables affect the oil block. To identify the structural
shocks (εt), further restrictions are also imposed on the contemporaneous and
13In this regard, the use of unrestricted VAR allows the data series to decide whether the
effects of the various oil shocks are permanent or temporary.
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the lagged matrix of (6) where
A0 =

1 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
a
(0)
21 1 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
a
(0)
31 a
(0)
32 1 | 0 0 0 0 0
−− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
a
(0)
41 a
(0)
42 a
(0)
43 | 1 0 0 0 0
a
(0)
51 a
(0)
52 a
(0)
53 | a(0)54 1 0 0 0
0 0 a
(0)
63 | a(0)64 a(0)65 1 0 0
0 0 a
(0)
73 | 0 a(0)75 a(0)76 1 0
a
(0)
81 a
(0)
82 a
(0)
83 | a(0)84 a(0)85 a(0)86 a(0)87 1

(7)
and
Bi =

b
(i)
11 b
(i)
12 b
(i)
13 | 0 0 0 0 0
b
(i)
21 b
(i)
22 b
(i)
23 | 0 0 0 0 0
b
(i)
31 b
(i)
32 b
(i)
33 | 0 0 0 0 0
−− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
b
(i)
41 b
(i)
42 b
(i)
43 | b(i)44 b(i)45 b(i)46 b(i)47 b(i)48
b
(i)
51 b
(i)
52 b
(i)
53 | b(i)54 b(i)55 b(i)56 b(i)57 b(i)58
0 0 b
(i)
63 | b(i)64 b(i)65 b(i)66 b(i)67 b(i)68
0 0 b
(i)
73 | 0 b(i)75 b(i)76 b(i)77 b(i)78
b
(i)
81 b
(i)
82 b
(i)
83 | b(i)84 b(i)85 b(i)86 b(i)87 b(i)88

. (8)
The restrictions imposed on the oil block in (7)and (8) are similar to those
imposed by Kilian (2009). The global oil supply is assumed not to respond to
global real economic activity and global real oil price within the same month but
do respond with a lag. These restrictions are realistic considering that the oil-
producing countries will be slow to respond to any changes in oil price or global
demand due to uncertainty associated with the state of the crude oil market
and the time and costs needed for adjusting the oil production. The global real
economic activity is assumed to be contemporaneously affected by the global
oil supply but not immediately by the oil price. This restriction is in line with
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the sluggish behavior of global real economic activity after each of the major oil
price (see Kilian, 2009). The oil price on the other hand is assumed to respond
immediately to changes in oil supply and global real economic activity. Apart
from the oil block exogeneity restrictions no other restrictions are imposed on
the lag structure.
The identified, three structural shocks in the oil block, ε1,t = [ε
os
t , ε
ga
t , ε
op
t ]
are oil-supply shock, global-activity shock and oil-specific shock respectively.
As in Kilian (2009), oil-supply shock is defined as unpredictable innovations
to global oil production, while global-activity shock is defined as shocks to the
global demand for industrial commodities and oil-specific shock is defined as
the demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future oil market and or finan-
cial conditions. This could include precautionary demand, speculative demand,
global liquidity and or the effects of monetary policy.
In the domestic components of the model, a number of restrictions are drawn
from the existing literature. Since oil is a crucial input for ASEAN-5, the price
of oil is assumed to affect the real sector and inflation immediately (see Kim
& Roubini, 2000; Raghavan & Dungey, 2015). In addition, the trade balance,
output and real exchange rates are assumed to be affected by changes in oil-
supply and global economic activity within a month. Among the domestic
variables, the trade balance is assumed to be the most exogenous variable and
thus is not contemporaneously affected by the domestic variables. Output is
influenced contemporaneously by trade balance, while inflation is affected by
both trade balance and output. These three variables are influenced by all five
domestic variables in the lag structure.
Real exchange rate is seen as an information market variable that reacts
quickly to all relevant economic disturbances and hence is affected by all the
variables in the systems both contemporaneously and in the lag structure. The
interest rate equation is assumed to be the reaction function of the ASEAN-5
Central banks which set the interest rate after observing the current oil price,
output and inflation. We include these variables and the lagged real exchange
rate in the monetary policy reaction function to control for current system-
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atic responses of monetary policy to the state of the economy like inflationary
pressure, demand disturbances and or external shocks; thus reflecting the open
economy Taylor rule.
Five additional restrictions were imposed on the contemporaneous structure
described in 7 for each economy.14 The over-identifying restrictions are not
rejected at the 1% significance level, thus suggesting that the identified model
specifications are appropriate.
5. Empirical Results
To obtain the orthogonal oil-supply, global-activity and oil-specific demand
shocks, the identification structure described in Section 4.2 is applied. The
sizes of the shocks are measured by one-standard deviation of the orthogonal
errors derived from the SVAR model. The impulse responses of each ASEAN-5’s
macroeconomic variables are normalized by dividing them with the standard de-
viation [εost = 0.991, ε
ga
t = 0.792 and ε
op
t = 065] of the respective three shocks.
68% confidence bands for the impulse functions are computed via bootstrapping
10000 samples, using the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method of Kilian (1998).
Historical decomposition is generated to asses the evolution of each economy’s
macroeconomic variables following major exogenous events in oil markets. Vari-
ance decomposition is provided to show the proportion of the variance in trade
balances and real exchange rates that are attributable to each shocks identified
in Equation 6.
5.1. What drives the global real price of oil between 2000 to 2013?
The impulse response functions of the real price of oil to the three identified
shocks in the oil block are derived and revealed in Figure 5. A disruption in the
oil-supply, defined as an unanticipated decline in the oil production, triggers a
delayed temporary rise in oil price after six months, peaking around 1% above
14The contemporaneous matrix B0 requires ((82 − 8)/2 = 28) restrictions for exact identi-
fication while in (7) there are 33 restrictions imposed, leading to over-identification.
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the baseline fifteen months later, before adjusting downwards.15 The effect
of an unanticipated expansion in global activity on the other hand led to an
immediate jump in oil price which peaked around 5% above the baseline six
months after the shock. The oil-supply shock tend to have a smaller positive
effect on oil price compared to the global activity shock. According to Kilian
(2009), the oil supply contractions in one region could trigger production in
other parts of the world, thus causing only a transitory inflationary effects on
the global economy. Since shifts in the oil-specific demand are generally driven
by expectations about future changes in oil and or financial conditions, they
tend to trigger an immediate and sharp changes in real price of oil.16 This can
be observed in Figure 5, a positive oil-specific demand shock on impact leads to
a significant rise in oil price around 6%.
Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Oil Price to Oil-Supply, Global-Activity and Oil-Specific
Shocks
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The historical decomposition of the real price of oil are shown in Figure 6.
Since 2000, the oil-supply shocks have made comparatively small contributions
to the oil price. The biggest contributions are from the oil-specific demand
shock and the global activity shock. The important channel though which ex-
ogenous events such as wars or financial market conditions affect the real price
15Each shock has been scaled up by 10; for example a response of 0.5 means 5%; this applies
to all impulse response functions reported in the following subsections.
16For example, a precautionary demand and or a speculative demand for oil could be driven
by expectations about future changes in oil supply or oil demand.
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of oil is through the oil-specific demand. Thus this channel causes sharply de-
fined increases and decreases in the price of oil. The sharp increase in the oil
price in 2004-2006 and in 2007-2008 can be attributed to precautionary and or
speculative demand, either in anticipation of stronger economic growth or in
anticipation of declining oil supplies (see Kilian, 2009; Kilian & Murphy, 2014,
for details). The rise in oil price between 2010-2011 can be attributed to global
liquidity conditions, particulary caused by the rise in China’s real M2 (see Ratti
& Vespignani, 2013, for details) or could be attributed to quantitative easing
measures undertaken by the majors advanced economies. This is consistent with
the view that oil-specific shocks may reflect rapid shifts in the markets assess-
ment of the uncertainty surrounding future oil supply and demand. The global
activity shock on the other hand causes prolonged and persistent swings in the
real price of oil and was obvious especially between the periods 2003 to 2008.
According to Kilian (2009); Kilian & Hicks (2013) and Kilian & Murphy (2014),
the surge in the real price of oil between 2003-2008 is mainly caused by shifts in
the demand for crude oil driven by the global business cycle. Overall, there are
important differences in the relative contribution of the three structural shocks
to the real price of oil for the past 13 years.
Figure 6: Historical Decomposition of Oil Price to Oil-Supply, Global-Activity and Oil-Specific
Shocks
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5.2. Macroeconomic Responses of the ASEAN-5 to Oil Shocks
The ”oil-macroeconomic” relationship of the ASEAN-5 are examined by gen-
erating impulse responses of trade, output, inflation, monetary policy and real
exchange rate, to the three specified shocks in the oil block. The response func-
tions for each shocks are revealed in Figures 7 to 9. These results illustrate the
important differences in how the oil demand and oil supply shocks underlying
the real price of oil affect ASEAN-5’s macroeconomic variables.
5.2.1. Oil-Supply Disruption Shock
A supply disruption shock is expected to trigger a rise in production costs and
a decline in global aggregate demand. This would induce inflationary pressure,
often placing downward pressure on economic growth, consistent with stagfla-
tionary effects of oil price shocks.17 In Figure 7, the unanticipated oil-supply
disruptions lower the production level on impact on all the economies except
for the Philippines. Singapore felt the largest negative output response around
1% below the baseline and it takes around thirty six months for the economy to
revert back to the baseline. This outcome is not surprising as almost one-fifth
of the worlds oil production is transported via the Malacca Straits and the re-
lated transport and processing industries account for around 5% of Singapore’s
GDP. So any disruption in oil supply is expected to have larger effect on Singa-
pore, given the importance of oil refining and distribution to it’s economy. In
comparison, output fell around 0.5% in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and
these economies only took around twelve to fifteen months to adjust back. The
Philippines’s delayed negative response after one year could be attributed to its
lower level trade and oil intensity compared to the other four economies.18
The inflationary response is positive in the four oil importing economies
and insignificant for Malaysia, the only net oil exporter in the group. The
inflationary effect however varies in length among the four economies, with the
17Stagflation is defined as a condition of slow economic growth accompanied by a rise in
prices.
18Refer to Figures 3 and 4.
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peak rate ranging between 0.5% to 2% depending on their oil self-sufficiency.
Given their relatively low level of oil self-sufficiency, the inflationary effects on
Singapore and the Philippines are higher compared to Thailand. However, it
is not clear as to why Indonesia’s inflationary effect is persistent, given it’s low
trade and oil intensity compared to Thailand. One possible explanation could be
that Indonesia’s total primary energy consumption grew by 43% between 2003
and 2013, and oil continues to account for the highest portion of Indonesia’s
energy mix at 38% in 2013 (EIA, 2015).
To alleviate the stagflationary effects caused by the oil-supply disruption
shock, monetary policy tend to be more accommodative in the ASEAN-5 where
the policy rates declined. In practice, the recession may be deepened in these
economies if monetary policy makers raise interest rates to combat the inflation-
ary pressures. Further, as observed in Figure 7, the oil-supply disruption shock
is not as inflationary as they used to be, thus allowing for a accommodative
monetary policy responses. The easing of monetary policy is larger in Indone-
sia and the Philippines compared to the measures undertaken in Malaysia and
Singapore.19 On the other hand, Thailand with an inflation targeting central
bank, did not respond to the oil-supply shock.
The effects on trade is as expected, positive for Malaysia while it is signif-
icantly negative for the Philippines for about six months. As for the other oil
importers it is generally moderate and insignificant. The real exchange rate
responses is positive for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand making these
economies less competitive in the global market. The effects however varies in
length among the three economies, depending on their responses to inflation.20
The decline in Malaysia’s real exchange rate could be attributed to higher for-
eign prices relative to the domestic price, as its retail prices for oil products are
19In Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand the monetary policy variable is
represented by the interest variable while in Singapore the policy variable is represented by
exchange rate.
20Real exchange rate is measured as nominal effective exchange multiplied by domestic price
level divided by foreign price level.
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subsidised. As for Singapore, the exchange rate is Singapore Monetary Author-
ity’s policy instrument and thus is kept low to stimulate the economy.
5.2.2. Oil demand shock driven by global economic activity
In response to an oil demand shock driven by global activity, all five economies
irrespective of trade intensity, oil self-sufficiency and oil intensity, experience an
increase in production, inflationary pressures, rise in interest rate and appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate . Consistent with Cashin et al. (2014) and as
expected, in response to a demand-driven oil price shock, output and inflation
move in the same direction, largely influenced by the global activity. In Figure
8, an unanticipated aggregate demand expansion causes a statistically signif-
icant increase in output in the first year, particularly for the trade intensive
economies of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. It peaks around six months
before reverting back to the baseline after a year, except for Thailand where the
positive effect lasts for about two years. This finding suggests that the primary
effect of higher global activity in these economies dominates the contractionary
effect of rising oil prices.
The corresponding inflationary effect shows a sustained increase that reaches
its maximum in the range between 2% to 4% in the first year and is statisti-
cally significant. The inflationary effect appear to be larger compared to that
caused by an oil-supply disruption. Higher domestic activity accompanied by
inflationary pressure on consumer prices, led to a rise in policy rate in all five
economies. The central banks of the ASEAN-5 could tightened their monetary
policy in response to higher oil price caused by global activity shock without
fear of weakening their economies. The policy response appear to be larger par-
ticularly in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, the three economies with
their respective central bank committed to inflation targeting.
The effects on trade varies among the five economies. Malaysia as oil ex-
porter experiences positive effect which peaks around 2% after six months and
reverts back to its baseline after two years. Indonesia and Philippines, the two
less trade intensive economies had minimal effect on trade. As for Singapore and
22
Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic variables to an Oil-Supply Disruption Shock
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Thailand, though they are trade intensive but they are also highly dependent on
imported oil. The positive effect of trade is felt immediately but eventually it
becomes negative due to the rising oil price. In addition, it could also partly be
explained by the rise in real exchange rate responses, making these economies
less competitive in the global market.
5.2.3. Oil-Specific Demand Shock
Oil-specific shocks are often associated with inflationary and foreign ex-
change pressures, which prompt central banks to raise the short-term interest
rates. In Figure 9, the responses of macroeconomics variables to an unantici-
pated oil-specific demand shock are reported. The effects on inflation, interest
rate and exchange rate are quite similar as to that observed for the demand
shock caused by global activity. The oil-specific demand shock as expected
causes a sustained and highly significant increase in inflation rate, compared
to the global activity or supply disruption shocks. The largest increase around
5% is observed in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Consequently, the
ASEAN-5 encounter a positive cost-push shock and face increasing risk or uncer-
tainty caused by oil price volatility. This is followed by tightening of monetary
policy where all five central banks increase their policy rate between 0.5% to
2%.
The real exchange rate appreciates making these economies less competitive
in the global market. This consequently reflects a negative trade balance effects
on all the economies except Malaysia. This negative effect is also felt in the
production, where the initial increase result in a gradual reduction in output
that reaches its minimum after a year. These results indicate the production
structures of these economies, which rely heavily upon trade. A rise in global
oil prices without a clear boost in global demand can easily lead to a slump,
since it will only raise the cost of production.
24
Figure 8: Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic variables to a Global Activity Shock
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic variables to Oil-Specific Shock
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5.3. Historical Decomposition of the ASEAN-5’s Macroeconomic and Policy
Variables
A useful contribution of an estimated SVAR is the historical decomposition,
which exposes the contribution of the oil shocks to the observed outcome at
each point in time. Figure 10 presents the historical decomposition of ASEAN-
5 output, inflation and monetary policy variables, for the period 2000-2013. The
variations in these variables over the sample period are primarily explained by
two drivers of oil shocks - global activity shocks and oil-specific shocks, while
oil disruption shocks played lesser role.
The analysis provides evidence that global activity shock is dominant in
explaining the variations in ASEAN-5 output, but the source of this shock has
fluctuated considerably over the sample. Sometimes dominant and positive, but
at other times acting as a damper to the dominant oil-specific demand shock,
especially following the GFC in 2008.
The contributions of differently sourced oil shocks to the variation in ASEAN-
5 inflation are shown in the middle panel of Figure 10. It is clear that during
2003-2008, global activity shock had strong positive contribution, while at other
times the contributions were negative. This reflects the strong role of trade in
these economies, influencing the domestic price movements. There is some evi-
dence that the oil-specific demand shock is responsible for instigating the infla-
tionary pressure. The positive movement during 2003-2008, can be attributed to
precautionary and or speculative demand, in anticipation of stronger economic
growth. The positive movement after 2010 can be attributed to global liquidity
conditions. During this time, the negative global activity shock act as damper
to the dominant positive oil-specific shock.
The variations in the ASEAN-5’s monetary policy variables to the three oil
shocks over the sample period are primarily in line with the movement in infla-
tion. This shows that the ASEAN-5’s central banks are focussed in maintaining
price stability. The global activity shock causes prolonged and persistent swings
in the policy variables and was obvious especially during 2003-2008 for Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand, the three trade intensive economies. It is clear that
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at various times, the transmission of the oil-specific shock is anticipated in the
domestic policy response. The source of this shock has fluctuated over the sam-
ple, at times positive, reinforcing the effect of global activity shock and other
times, acting as a damper.
5.4. Variance Decomposition of the ASEAN-5’s Trade and Exchange Rate
Tables 1 and 2, reports the proportion of the variance of the trade balance
and the real exchange rate respectively that are attributable to shocks to each
of the variables in the model. Results are reported for forecast horizons 1, 12,
36 and 60 months ahead. Focussing first on the trade balance, the decompo-
sitions show that over the longer horizons, a substantial part of the variance
in trade in each economy is explained by shocks in oil market variables. At 60
months, 62.43% of the variance in Malaysian trade is attributed to oil market
variables. As a net exporter of oil, large part of these variation is influenced
by the global activity shock (50.63%) while contributions from domestic vari-
ables are minimal. For Indonesia, 42% of the variance is attributed to oil-supply
shock while 13% is due to interest rate and 18% is due to real exchange rate
respectively. Around 54% of the variance in trade for Singapore and Philippines
are actually attributed to their own shock. For the Philippines, global activity
shock contributes 28% of the variance to trade while for Singapore both demand
driven shocks contribute around 25% of the variance to trade. In Thailand, the
oil market variables contributed only around 24.42% of the variance in trade,
lowest among the five economies while domestic production contributed around
16%.
Focusing on the real exchange rate, the decomposition highlights that with
exception of Thailand, in all the other economies, the global activity shock
plays an important role in driving the movement in the real exchange rate.
For Thailand, the trade shock appear to be contributing more then the the oil
market variables. Another interesting observation is that for Malaysia, around
62% of the variation in the exchange rate is attributed to its own shock. This
could be due the fact that the ringgit was pegged till 2005 and thus it contains
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Figure 10: Historical Decomposition of Output, Inflation, Policy variable to Oil-Supply,
Global-Activity and Oil-Specific Shocks
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Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the Trade Balance
Shock
Months ost gat opt tbt yt pit rt qt
Indonesia
1 1.47 0.42 0.51 97.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 11.68 0.63 5.08 48.61 2.39 1.60 20.72 9.29
36 39.69 2.31 1.76 14.94 2.13 1.44 13.95 23.78
60 42.40 6.97 3.52 11.95 1.71 2.43 12.99 18.03
Malaysia
1 0.08 4.43 4.80 90.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 2.26 46.52 6.74 33.85 5.83 0.30 3.65 0.83
36 6.21 50.55 5.31 26.69 5.47 0.29 4.33 1.54
60 6.55 50.63 5.25 25.91 5.45 0.29 4.31 1.61
the Philippines
1 0.00 1.28 0.76 97.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 2.00 8.00 0.81 74.21 1.62 0.89 10.03 2.43
36 3.50 26.06 0.87 56.78 1.41 0.76 7.72 2.90
60 4.70 28.17 0.90 54.04 1.34 0.73 7.34 2.77
Singapore
1 0.00 1.09 0.69 98.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.68 3.75 12.49 71.49 2.86 2.39 3.45 2.88
36 0.70 9.52 13.73 56.18 2.48 5.80 7.52 4.08
60 0.71 10.20 14.27 54.73 2.55 5.94 7.52 4.06
Thailand
1 0.92 3.86 0.03 95.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 4.28 5.29 8.10 55.24 15.42 7.27 2.06 2.34
36 6.24 8.17 7.47 50.24 16.36 7.12 2.31 2.10
60 6.47 10.70 7.25 48.54 15.80 6.90 2.30 2.04
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much of the movement in the exchange rate. On the other hand, Singapore’s real
exchange rate movement is largely influenced by global activity shock, around
66%. Among the five economies, Singapore is the most trade intensive economy
and the exchange rate is the monetary policy instrument. So global activity will
have substantial effects on Singapore and its Monetary authority would want to
contain that effects through exchange rate variation. As for Indonesia, global
activity shock contributes 22% while domestic interest rate contributes 30% of
the variation in the exchange rate.
6. Conclusion
Oil is a critical source of energy and thus any abrupt and or sharp increases
in oil prices can have detrimental effects on the macroeconomic variables such
as economic growth, inflation and trade balances. The general consensus is that
oil price shocks can push cost of production up leading to higher inflation and
declining output level. Following these, there is clear evidence that policymak-
ers care about oil shocks and are concern about managing inflation expectations
when hit with an oil shock. Since the late 1990s, the global economy has ex-
perienced two oil shocks, one in 2004 and the other in 2006, largely driven by
increasing global demand for oil. As highlighted in Kilian (2009) and Kilian &
Murphy (2014), the economic consequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock
are very different from those of an oil-demand shock driven by global economic
activity.
This paper contributes to and extends the existing literature in two main
areas. First, using an SVAR models with small open economy properties, it
divides the variables into two blocks - oil block and the domestic block. The oil
block captures the conditions in the global oil market and as in Kilian (2009)
it decomposes the oil price shocks into oil-supply, oil-demand and oil-specific
shocks. Second, using developing economy application, it analyses the interac-
tion between domestic and oil block variables. It emphasizes the transmission
of the three identified shocks in the oil block to the ASEAN-5 economies and
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Table 2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the Exchange Rate
Shock
Months ost gat opt tbt yt pit rt qt
Indonesia
1 0.00 0.00 0.74 4.75 0.32 7.56 1.24 85.39
12 4.84 25.51 2.51 3.42 0.35 7.32 13.96 42.09
36 4.34 23.71 2.82 3.07 0.21 11.00 28.81 26.05
60 4.88 22.01 2.70 3.43 0.29 10.75 30.31 25.63
Malaysia
1 0.43 0.58 0.40 0.69 0.45 0.49 2.65 94.30
12 2.56 6.69 12.77 0.14 1.11 4.54 3.03 69.17
36 2.72 13.48 7.82 0.48 4.55 5.56 1.72 63.67
60 2.28 15.83 6.94 0.54 5.68 5.47 1.61 61.66
the Philippines
1 2.12 0.03 0.27 0.12 4.22 2.80 1.13 89.30
12 16.89 9.04 2.22 3.59 1.70 2.70 1.54 62.32
36 23.71 10.00 5.90 1.76 0.68 1.58 0.62 25.75
60 25.00 41.86 5.41 1.61 0.62 1.45 0.57 23.49
Singapore
1 0.15 1.97 0.00 0.72 1.61 0.02 0.86 94.66
12 0.98 55.11 10.33 0.16 3.45 0.10 0.98 28.90
36 1.21 66.67 6.48 0.18 2.64 0.82 4.94 16.53
60 1.58 65.78 6.33 0.19 2.57 1.41 5.99 16.16
Thailand
1 2.64 5.91 7.04 4.12 0.74 2.94 0.52 76.08
12 5.94 4.02 8.79 15.19 3.15 6.14 4.30 52.47
36 5.58 5.63 8.43 15.07 3.93 5.77 7.15 48.45
60 5.56 6.19 8.40 15.04 3.97 5.73 7.10 48.02
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the responses of monetary policy to the various oil shocks. The econometric
framework uses exogeneity restrictions for the oil block in relation to ASEAN-5
economies.
The analysis provides us with some useful insights as to the nature of the
effects of various oil shocks on ASEAN-5. The underlying source of the oil-price
shock is crucial in determining its macroeconomic consequence for an oil im-
porter as opposed to an oil exporter. It suggest that oil disruption shocks are
relatively unimportant during 2000-2013 on ASEAN-5’s macroeconomic vari-
ables. A global activity shock, which stimulates major economies’ output, raises
ASEAN-5’s output, inflation increases and this is followed by a contractionary
monetary policy responses. On the other hand, the oil-specific shock triggers a
substantial rise in inflation, followed by a rise in policy rate which triggers a fall
in output. A global activity shock makes a notable contribution to Malaysia’s
trade balance and to Singapore and the Philippines real exchange rate. An oil
supply shock causes large movements in Indonesia’s trade balance. Apart from
the oil market variables, interest rate plays an important role for Indonesia’s
trade and real exchange rate movements while output plays an important role
for Thailand’s trade balance. This illustrates the potential complexity of the
transmission mechanisms of the various oil shocks on the ASEAN-5’s macroe-
conomic variables.
Whether monetary policy is tightened in ASEAN-5 in response to higher
oil price depends on the impact of each sources of oil shock on output relative
to inflation. As the recent oil price shocks are demand driven, the impulse
responses and historical decomposition highlights that the effects on inflation
are accentuated while the effects on economic growth are less disruptive. Con-
sequently, the central banks of these economies could tighten their monetary
policy in response to higher inflation, especially in the oil importing economies
without fear of weakening their economies. Though as small open economies
there is little the ASEAN-5 can do to influence future oil price shocks, these
economies may need to pursue prudent monetary policy measures that are more
supportive of growth. This is crucial for the operational conduct of monetary
33
policy for achieving price stability and sustainable economic growth.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Table 3: Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Oil Block
ost Global Oil Production US Energy Information Website
(Percentage change per annum)
gat Global Real Activity Kilian - UM Personal Website
(Deviation from trend)
opt World Oil Price Index, Spot Oil Price: West Texas
(Percentage change per annum) Intermediate, FRED Database
Domestic Block
tbt Real Trade Balance Datastream
(SA and detrended),
yt Industrial/Manufacturing Production Datastream
(Logs, SA and detrended)
pit Consumer Price Index Datastream
(Percentage change per annum)
rt Inter-Bank Rate/ Datastream
Treasury Bills Rate (Percentage)
qt Real Effective Exchange Rate, Logs Datastream
(Logs, SA and detrended)
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